PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS COMPARISON ON VARIOUS CYBER-ATTACK DATASET BY RELATING A DEEP BELIEF NETWORK MODEL ON AN INTRUSION DETECTION SYSTEM (IDS)

S.Priya ¹, Dr.K.Pradeep Mohan Kumar ²

¹ Research scholar,SRMIST,Kattankulathur

² Assistant Professor,SRMIST

Abstract: In latest eon there are prompt development in Deep learning techniques which is the subset of Machine learning and AI which leads to instinctive innovation of growth in technologies. In general not only in Engineering, researches but also major improvement in medical fields. So deep learning techniques is being applied on emphasizing network security applications. Most observed in network security systems are intruders, which can be viruses,Dos attacks and Penetration among the network makes the difference in the activities of networks.So dynamic methods can be followed to detect and prevent the attack by intruders.In terms, intrusion detection system(IDS) has so many static datasets which was analyzed for traffic alignments. In that aspects for more accuracy and analyzing the deep learning techniques.IDS are classified such as pattern based intrusion detection,time interval based intrusion detection.We focus on antivirus related signature based intrusions. The datasets such as KDDcup 99 and UNSW-NB15 are the preexisting databases that have variety of patterns. Main focus on generating the False alarm rate (FAR) and nominal IDS using Deep Belief Network (DBF). This DBF identifies the unpredictable and unanticipated cyber-attacks in both static and dynamic methods. A performance analysis using malware IDS datasets such as **KDD** dataset DARPA/KDDcup, ADFA-LD and NSL-KDD, CICIDS2017, Iot Device Network logs and UNSW-NB15 features are identified and passed into hidden layers by applying a softmax classifier

Keywords: Cyber-attacks, Deep Learning, FAR, IDS, KDDcup99, UNSW-NB15

1. Introduction

Cyber security is the latest technology that has all over attention worldwide. The Wireless networks via cloud vulnerability are becoming the huge issues that make up constitute a threat. The organization are collecting through internet not only the information's required but also all sensitive data's such as date of birth, andhar number etc. those data's are turned into business usage such as hacking the passwords, Dos attacks, phis icing attacks[2].




Fig.1.A DBN approach that represents the intrusion features labeled with weights

Figure 1 shows the deep belief networks (DBN) which has representation of direct connections with visible layer as input (vi) that is depicted as propagative explicit model. These visible layer detects the feature which are multiple layer of variable that terms many hidden layers(h1)only and not connected with its units[7].

1.1 A Deep Learning Approach On IDS

The development of all complicated to even simple tasks is changed into advanced techniques such as Artificial intelligence, ML and Deep learning. Since then the results compared to out date techniques predictions are perfect with these methodologies. Network security systems are future focused on all aspects by Engineering field to research till date. The general attacks such as brute force, DOS or viruses

also considered as intrusion systems[1]. Even the network every now and then gets update and nowhere the traffic changes frequently or the state of changes that happened every time is recorded as parameters of networks. In such cases we name or mention those as intrusion when some anonymous or malicious changes takes place and monitored in the network. Either the network must be prevented without attacks or there must be detection of the entire systems. There the techniques called Intrusion detection System (IDS)[3]. The techniques such as Deep learning which is a most powerful technique that are shape into a automatic feature extraction that implies the network with sturdy IDS.

The main objective of this paper is to performance analysis of various data sets that are static and dynamic approach on intrusion detection systems in cyber-attacks. The deep learning technique DBF(a generative model) which will analyses the various dataset in IDS[15]. We focus our research work on UNSW-NB15 as input and passes into multiple layer generative model which helps to identify the labeled features by applying the softmax classifier. The further work is based on different parameters from the same database from intrusion detection systems.

The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 deals with the related work, Section 3 discusses about the UNSW-NB15 dataset, Section 4 deals with the discussions and Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. Related Work

Detecting intrusion in systems is further classified as N_T_IDS which is based on networks and also as H_T_IDS which is based on the hosts [9]. Research focus towards the intrusion systems has nowadays involves the solutions based on machine learning approaches. Both deep learning as well as machine learning methods goes hand in hand while dealing with the solutions for intrusions in the system [6].

N_T_IDS (System to detect intrusion based on Networks)

N_T_IDS is one of the important research topic for researchers of today's world. Such systems are keen on usage of metrics such as length of packets, arrival time of packets, size of flow of the packets including several other metrics[5]. The main limitation associated with them is both the false positive as well as false negative seems to be high. The former limitation indicates that attack alerts can be received even at times when such incidents have not taken place. The latter limitation indicates that the system may not be able to identify the attack in an evident way. Such situations make these solutions to become invalid in the context of attacks.

Systems based on self learning comes to rescue in order to avoid the attacks. Such systems can be further classified as supervised as well as unsupervised systems that focus on learning of patterns from the attacks made in the systems. Though machine learning methods are available to solve the issues, still they suffer from certain limitations including the higher cost for computation as well as false positive rates at a

higher value. The main reason behind this is the learning capability of TCP/IP attributes by the classifiers which happens locally. The subset of machine learning is deep learning which passes the TCP/IP data to layers which are hidden in the deep learning networks that play a major role in representation of features [14]. Functionalities related to artificial intelligence for processing images as well as recognition of speech and many more are the fields in which deep learning has attained good results [4]. In addition to these, such works have taken a new shape as detecting intrusion, analysis of malware and its classification, predicting the traffic of network, detecting ransomware, categorizing the text that is encrypted, detecting URL which seems to be malicious, and so on[13]. Our work is focused on analyzing the existing methods from machine learning as well as deep learning with the available dataset for N_T IDS[5].

Our work mainly concentrates on efficacy of the deep learning methods while applying dataset related to IDS such as UNSW-NB15. KDDCUP 99 is yet another dataset predominantly used in IDS systems. But it suffers from certain limitations such as redundancy of data as a result of which bias may occur while detecting. Another limitation may be the data missed at some places as a result of which problems keep on arising. Yet another improvised version of KDDCUP 99 is dataset named as NSLKDD which can handle the missing data problems. But it also suffers from certain limitations when attacks are being encountered [8].

The features extracted in KDDCUP 99 dataset were further divided into three separate groups including vectors of 4 types for attacks. It also included few number in types of attacks both training as well as testing dataset. As the dataset was available publicly, it was used by various research people across the globe. In case of attacks, the data packets's TTL gets affected here. Another limitation is that concerned with the distribution of probability differences occur among both the training as well as testing dataset [16]. Biased decision may occur due to these differences. It also does not perform well in case of attack projections.

NSLKDD, as already mentioned is another version of KDD in an updated manner. Compared to KDDCUP 99 it was designed to handle several characteristics such as elimination of duplicates, selecting several data records at the same time and also deals with the elimination of problems related to unbalance in both the training as well as testing dataset. Due to these features, FAR named as False Alarm Rate gets decreased [9]. Also NSLKDD does not represent attack projections.

3. UNSW-NB15 Dataset

IXIA tool was used to create the dataset UNSW-NB15 mainly for extracting the attack related works in a traffic. Its features along with attacks as well are discussed in detail. Attacks in UNSW-NB15 includes 9 types as depicted in Fig.2.



Fig.2. Attack Types

Features of the dataset is discussed in detail along with the purpose of the features (Fig.3).



Fig.3 UNSW-NB15 Dataset Features

3.1 Features Related to Flow

Table 1 shows the features related to flow. These features mainly focus on the IP address of the source as well as destination along with the port number.

Table 1. Features Related to Flow

| No. | Name Name | | Type | Description | |
|-----|-----------|------|---------|-------------------------|--|
| 1 | srcip | Flow | nominal | Source IP address | |
| 2 | sport | Flow | integer | Source port number | |
| 3 | dstip | Flow | nominal | Destination IP address | |
| 4 | dsport | Flow | integer | Destination port number | |
| 5 | proto | Flow | nominal | Transaction protocol | |

3.2 Basic Features

The features related to TTL both on source and destination side along with count of packets during transmission are taken as basic features.

Table 2 Basic Features

| No. | Name | Туре | Description | |
|-----|---------|---------|--|--|
| 6 | state | nominal | Indicates to the state and its dependent protocol, e.g. ACC, CLO, CON, and (-) (if not used state) | |
| 7 | dur | Float | Record total duration | |
| 8 | sbytes | Integer | Source to destination transaction bytes | |
| 9 | dbytes | Integer | Destination to source transaction bytes | |
| 10 | sttl | Integer | Source to destination time to live value | |
| 11 | dttl | Integer | Destination to source time to live value | |
| 12 | sloss | Integer | Source packets retransmitted or dropped | |
| 13 | dloss | Integer | Destination packets retransmitted or dropped | |
| 14 | service | nominal | http, ftp, smtp, ssh, dns, ftp-data ,irc and (-) if not much used service | |
| 15 | Sload | Float | Source bits per second | |
| 16 | Dload | Float | Destination bits per second | |
| 17 | Spkts | integer | Source to destination packet count | |
| 18 | Dpkts | integer | Destination to source packet count | |

3.3 Features related to Content

The features are mostly created on generation of header packet and Table 3 shows both source as well as destination TCP window related features[17].

Table 3 Features related to Content

| No. | Name | Туре | Description | |
|-----|-------------|---------|---|--|
| 19 | swin | integer | Source TCP window advertisement value | |
| 20 | dwin | integer | Destination TCP window advertisement value | |
| 21 | stepb | integer | Source TCP base sequence number | |
| 22 | dtepb | integer | Destination TCP base sequence number | |
| 23 | smeansz | integer | Mean of the ?ow packet size transmitted by the src | |
| 24 | dmeansz | integer | Mean of the ?ow packet size transmitted by the dst | |
| 25 | trans_depth | integer | Represents the pipelined depth into the connection of http request/response transaction | |
| 26 | res_bdy_len | integer | Actual uncompressed content size of the data transferred from the server? http service. | |

3.4 Features related to Time

Table 4 shows jitter related features which are categorized in relation with time for both source and destination [12]. Till the features related to time, all are created from the packets through which data is sent.

Table 4 Features related to Time

| No. | Name | Туре | Description | |
|-----|---------|-----------|--|--|
| 27 | Sjit | Float | Source jitter (mSec) | |
| 28 | Djit | Float | Destination jitter (mSec) | |
| 29 | Stime | Timestamp | record start time | |
| 30 | Ltime | Timestamp | record last time | |
| 31 | Sintpkt | Float | Source interpacket arrival time (mSec) | |
| 32 | Dintpkt | Float | Destination interpacket arrival time (mSec) | |
| 33 | teprtt | Float | TCP connection setup round-trip time, the sum of 2synack? and 2ackdat?. | |
| 34 | synack | Float | TCP connection setup time, the time between the SYN and the SYN_ACK packets. | |
| 35 | ackdat | Float | TCP connection setup time, the time between the SYN_ACK and the ACK packets. | |

3.5 General Features

Features are generated additionally and further classified as those which help in general works and those which defend during connection issues. Table 5 shows features that serve several works related to any other general purpose [12].

Table 5 General Features

| No. | Name | Туре | Description | |
|-----|------------------|---------|---|--|
| 36 | is_sm_ips_ports | Binary | If source (1) and destination (3)IP addresses equal and port numbers (2)(4) equal then, this variable takes value 1 else 0 | |
| 37 | ct_state_ttl | Integer | No. for each state (6) according to specific range of values for source/destination time to live (10) (11). | |
| 38 | ct_flw_http_mthd | Integer | No. of flows that has methods such as Get and Post in http service | |
| 39 | is_ftp_login | Binary | If the flp session is accessed by user and password then 1 else 0. | |
| 40 | ct_ftp_cmd | integer | No of flows that has a command in ftp session. | |

3.6 Feature related to connection

The second category in case of additional feature is those related to connections, that defend in case of scenarios where connections are attempted. Table 6 shows connection related features.

Table 6 Feature related to connection

| No. | Name | Type | Description | |
|-----|------------------|---------|---|--|
| 41 | ct_srv_src | integer | No. of connections that contain the same service (14) and source address (1) in 100 connections according to the last time (26). | |
| 42 | ct_srv_dst | integer | No. of connections that contain the same service (14) and destination address (3) in 100 connections according to the last time (26). | |
| 43 | ct_dst_ltm | integer | No. of connections of the same destination address (3) in 100 connections according to the last time (26). | |
| 44 | ct_src_ltm | integer | No. of connections of the same source address (1) in 100 connections according to the last time (26). | |
| 45 | ct_src_dport_ltm | integer | No of connections of the same source address (1) and the destination port (4) in 100 connections according to the last time (26). | |
| 46 | ct_dst_sport_ltm | integer | No of connections of the same destination address (3) and the source port (2) in 100 connections according to the last time (26) | |
| 47 | ct_dst_src_ltm | integer | No of connections of the same source (1) and the destination (3) address in in 100 connections according to the last time (26). | |

3.7 Features related to label

Features used to label can help in assigning values 0 or 1 and also attack_cat deals with the categories of attack.

Table 7 Features related to label

| No. | Name | Туре | Description | |
|-----|------------|---------|--|--|
| 48 | attack_cat | nominal | The name of each attack category. In this data set , nine categories e.g. Fuzzers, Analysis, Backdoors, DoS Exploits, Generic, Reconnaissance, Shellcode and Worms | |
| 49 | Label | binary | 0 for normal and 1 for attack records | |

4. Discussions

The novel attacks such as static and anomaly detection are general in IDS, the network traffic captures raw traffic and identified as features for configuring class labels that are in parallel processing and stored as CSV files. There are major attacks such as fuzzers, analyzer, denial of service attack, backdoor,shellcode,worm are considered and they are observed with its class label with its instances[11]. According to the DB model the training and test process are undergone with its authentication for assessments. This helps to remove the repeated data's in both 60% of training data and 40% of test data[18].

4.1 Comparison of Various datasets in IDS

Table defines the various datasets in intrusion detection systems with its features, establishment of datasets year, online availability and its data capacity. IDS analysis with various data determines the feature correlations and avoid unit based interaction in the hidden layers.

Table 8: Comparison of Various datasets in IDS

| Static & Dynamic Methods | Datasets Systems | In Int | rusion Do | etection |
|--------------------------------|---------------------------|-------------------|----------------------------|----------------------|
| Name Of Datasets | Establis hment Year | No.Of Features | Online Data Existing | Data Capa city |
| KDDCUP9 | 1998 | 99 | yes | 5m point s |
| DARPA | 1999 | 54 | yes | Not specif ied |
| TWENTE | 2008 | 71 | yes | 14M flows |
| UNIBS | 2009 | 79 | yes | 79k flows |
| ISCX2012 | 2012 | 28 | yes | 2M flows |
| NGIDS-DS | 2016 | 19 | yes | 1M packe ts |
| UNSW- NB15 | 2015 | 49 | yes | 2M point s |
| CICIDS201 7 | 2017 | 27 | yes | 3.1M flows |

5. Conclusion:

In this paper, the performance analysis of IDS datasets have been represented along with its feature analysis by comparing various datasets which is applied over the deep belief network along with Sigmoid classifier[10]. To highlight our focus on UNSW-NB15 datasets the most known attacks such as state are abnormal changes[8]. There are features compared from different datasets in intrusion system to show the attacks and information of packets which are not in use now. In future this can be classified based on the DBF model and applied classifier sigmoid which helps to identify the exact behavior of each features at its variables find the appropriate modeling

References

- [1] Mukherjee, B., Heberlein, L. T., & Levitt, K. N. (1994).Network intrusiondetection.IEEE network, 8(3), 26-41.
- [2] Larson, D. (2016). Distributed denial of service attacks-holding back theflood. Network Security, 2016(3), 5-7.
- [3] Staudemeyer, R. C. (2015). Applying long short-term memory recurrentneural networks to intrusion detection. South African Computer Journal,56(1), 136-154.

- [4] Venkatraman, S., Alazab, M. "Use of Data Visualisation forZero-Day Malware Detection," Security and CommunicationNetworks, vol. 2018, Article ID 1728303, 13 pages, 2018.https://doi.org/10.1155/2018/1728303
- [5] Mishra, P., Varadharajan, V., Tupakula, U., & Pilli, E. S. (2018). Adetailed investigation and analysis of using machine learning techniquesfor intrusion detection. IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials.
- [6] Azab, A., Alazab, M. &Aiash, M. (2016) "Machine Learning BasedBotnet Identification Traffic" The 15th IEEE International Conference onTrust, Security and Privacy in Computing and Communications (Trustcom2016), Tianjin, China, 23-26 August, pp. 1788-1794.
- [7] Vinayakumar R. (2019, January 19). vinayakumarr/Intrusion-detection v1(Version v1). Zenodo. http://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2544036
- [8] Tang, M., Alazab, M., Luo, Y., Donlon, M. (2018) Disclosure of cybersecurity vulnerabilities: time series modelling, International Journal ofElectronic Security and Digital Forensics. Vol. 10, No.3, pp 255 - 275.
- [9] V. Paxson. Bro: A system for detecting network intruders in realtime. Computer networks, vol. 31, no. 23, pp. 24352463, 1999. DOIhttp://dx.doi. org/10.1016/S1389-1286(99)00112-7
- [10] LeCun, Y., Bengio, Y., & Hinton, G. (2015). Deep learning.nature,521(7553), 436.
- [11] Xin, Y., Kong, L., Liu, Z., Chen, Y., Li, Y., Zhu, H., ...&Wang, C. (2018).Machine Learning and Deep Learning Methods for Cybersecurity. IEEEAccess.
- [12] Hofmeyr, S. A., Forrest, S., &Somayaji, A. (1998). Intrusion detectionusing sequences of system calls. Journal of computer security, 6(3),151180.
- [13] Forrest, S., Hofmeyr, S. A., Somayaji, A., &Longstaff, T. A. (1996,May). A sense of self for unix processes. In Security and Privacy, 1996.Proceedings., 1996 IEEE Symposium on (pp. 120-128). IEEE.
- [14] Hubballi, N., Biswas, S., & Nandi, S. (2011, January). Sequencegram:n-gram modeling of system calls for program based anomaly detection. In Communication Systems and Networks (COMSNETS), 2011 ThirdInternational Conference on (pp. 1-10). IEEE.
- [15] Hubballi, N. (2012, January). Pairgram: Modeling frequency information of lookahead pairs for system call based anomaly detection. In CommunicationSystems and Networks

- (COMSNETS), 2012 Fourth InternationalConference on (pp. 1-10). IEEE.
- [16] Kozushko, H. (2003). Intrusion detection: Host-based and network-basedintrusion detection systems. on September, 11.
- [17] W. Lee and S. Stolfo. A framework for constructing features and modelsfor intrusion detection systems. ACM transactions on information and system security, vol. 3, no. 4, pp. 227261, 2000. DOI http://dx.doi.org/10.1145/382912.382914
- [18] Ozgur, A., Erdem, H.: A review of KDD99 dataset usage in intrusion detection and machine learning between 2010 and 2015. PeerJPrePrints4 (2016) e1954

1S.PRIYA,
RESEARCH SCHOLAR,
DEPARTMENT OF CSE,
SRM INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
spriyampk@gmail.com

2Dr.K.Pradeep Mohan Kumar,
ASSISTANT PROFESSOR,
DEPARTMENT OF CSE,
SRM INSTITUTE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,
pradeepk@srmist.edu.in